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VIOLATING EQUAL PROTECTION: 
LYNCH V. MORALES-SANTANA 





The Constitution’s equal protection guarantee prevents 
legislatures from drawing distinctions solely on the basis of sex.1 
Nevertheless, “our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of 
sex discrimination.”2 The Court first invalidated a statute for 
discriminating on the basis of sex in 1971.3 Since then, the Court has 
applied intermediate scrutiny to laws that discriminate against both 
men and women on the basis of their gender.4 Laws cannot be based 
on “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, 
or preferences of male and females.”5 
The laws regarding when an unwed parent’s citizenship can be 
passed on to a child born abroad have played a role in this country’s 
history of sex discrimination.6 For example, under the statutes at issue 
in Lynch v. Morales-Santana,7 an unwed U.S. citizen father cannot 
convey citizenship at-birth to his child unless he has been physically 
present in the United States for ten years prior to the child’s birth, 
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1.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”). 
2.  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1977).
3.  Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
4.  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
5.  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
6.  Brief Amici Curiae of Professors of History, Political Science, and Law in Support of
Respondent at 2, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, NO. 15-1191 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2016). 
7.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) (1952). 
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while an unwed U.S. citizen mother need only be present for one 
continuous year. By invalidating this statutory scheme the Court can 
take a step towards removing sex-discrimination from derivative 
citizenship laws. 
This commentary argues that the Supreme Court should apply 
intermediate scrutiny to invalidate the scheme set forth by §§ 1401 
and 1409 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) because it 
discriminates on the basis of a parent’s gender. Further, the Court 
should remedy this equal protection violation by applying the shorter 
physical presence requirement, which currently applies only to 
mothers, to both genders. 
FACTS 
Luis Ramon Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican 
Republic in 1962 to unmarried parents.8 Morales-Santana’s mother 
was a citizen of the Dominican Republic.9 His father was born in 
Puerto Rico and became a United States citizen in 1917 through the 
Jones Act.10 He was physically present in Puerto Rico until he left to 
work for a U.S. company in the Dominican Republic, just twenty days 
short of his nineteenth birthday.11 
In 1970, Morales-Santana’s parents married, which legitimated 
him in accordance with § 1409(a).12 At the age of thirteen, he moved 
to the United States where he continued to live for more than forty 
years.13 
In 2000, after several felony convictions, Morales-Santana was 
placed into removal proceedings.14 Morales-Santana claimed he 
should not be removed because he had obtained derivative citizenship 
at birth from his father.15 The immigration judge denied his 
application.16 Morales-Santana filed a motion to reopen, claiming that 
the statutes governing derivative citizenship violated his father’s right 
 
 8.  Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521, 524 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 
2545 (2016).   
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Brief for Respondent at 10, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, NO. 15-1191 (U.S. Sept. 26, 
2016) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].  
 12.  Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524.  
 13.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 10. 
 14.  Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524.   
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id. 
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to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.17 His derivative 
citizenship claim was again rejected and the Bureau of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) denied his motion to reopen.18 
Under the INA of 1952, the statute in effect at the time of 
Morales-Santana’s birth, an unwed citizen mother could provide 
citizenship at birth to her child, born abroad with a non-citizen father, 
as long as the mother was “physically present in the United States or 
one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year” at 
any point prior to the child’s birth.19 In contrast, an unwed citizen 
father could not provide derivative citizenship to a child born abroad 
to a non-citizen mother unless he was “physically present in the 
United States or one of its outlying possessions for a period or period 
totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after 
attaining the age of fourteen years” prior to the child’s birth.20 
Having left Puerto Rico just twenty days before his nineteenth 
birthday, Morales-Santana’s father was unable to satisfy the statutory 
requirement to provide derivative citizenship at birth to his son.21 He 
did, however, satisfy the requirement that applies to unwed citizen 
mothers.22 
Morales-Santana asked the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit to review the BIA’s decision to deny his motion 
for citizenship. He argued that the gender-based difference in the 
physical presence requirements imposed under §§ 1409(c) and 
1401(a)(7) that places a more onerous burden on unwed fathers, 
violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.23 The 
Second Circuit agreed with Morales-Santana and held that he had 
acquired derivative citizenship at birth from his father.24 The 
Government petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme 
Court of the United States, which was granted on June 28, 2016.25 
 
 17.  Id. at 524–25.  
 18.  Id. at 525.  
 19.  8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952). 
 20.  § 1401(a)(7) (1952). The disparate treatment of unwed citizen mothers and fathers 
remains in the current version of the statutes. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1409 (a) and (c) (2012) (requiring 
that unwed citizen fathers be physically present for five years with at least two of those years 
being after the age of fourteen, while unwed citizen mothers are still subject to the same one-
year continuous presence requirement).  
 21.  Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523.   
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 523–24.   
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Lynch v. Morales-Santana, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016).  
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states 
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”26 The Supreme Court has held that this 
right applies to the federal government through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.27 
Laws that discriminate on the basis of gender are reviewed under 
intermediate scrutiny.28 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the 
government must have an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for 
using the gender classification.29 The government is required to show 
“at least that the [challenged] classification serves ‘important 
government objectives and that the discriminatory means employed 
are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”30 The 
justification must be “genuine, not hypothesized or invented post 
hoc.”31 Furthermore, the justification may not “rely on overbroad 
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences 
of males and females.”32 The burden of proving that a gender 
classification satisfies intermediate scrutiny is “demanding and it rests 
entirely on the State.”33 
The Court’s decision in Fiallo v. Bell34 has made how or whether 
intermediate scrutiny should be applied in the context of immigration, 
citizenship, and naturalization murky. In Fiallo, the Court considered 
a challenge by a group of alien fathers and children to an Immigration 
and Naturalization Service provision that provided a special 
immigration preference based on a relationship to a citizen mother, 
but not a father.35 In deference to Congress’s plenary powers of 
immigration and naturalization, the Court declined to apply 
heightened scrutiny.36 
In Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS,37 the Court reviewed the equal 
protection implications of § 1409(a), which requires that unwed 
 
 26.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 27.  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
 28.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).  
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id. (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id. (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975)). 
 33.  Id. (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).  
 34.  430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 35.  Id. at 788. 
 36.  Id. at 799.  
 37.  533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
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citizen fathers, but not mothers, legitimate their children born abroad 
in order to provide citizenship at birth.38 The Court held that the 
gender classification was substantially related to ensuring “that a 
biological parent-child relationship exists”39 and to ensuring that there 
would be “real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child 
and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”40 In reaching this 
holding, the Court relied on the fact that women but not men are 
biologically required to be present at a child’s birth.41 Because the 
Court found that the classification withstood intermediate scrutiny, it 
did not have to decide whether a lesser form of scrutiny should apply 
in deference to Congress’s plenary powers.42 
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the physical presence 
requirements at issue here, assuming, without deciding, that 
heightened scrutiny applied.43 The court upheld the differing physical 
presence requirements, recognizing the Government’s interests in 
preventing statelessness and ensuring children born abroad would 
have sufficient ties to the United States.44 The Ninth Circuit held that 
the fit between the gender classification and asserted interests was 
“sufficiently persuasive in light of the virtually plenary power that 
Congress has to legislate in the area of immigration and citizenship.”45 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision by an 
equally divided court.46 
III.  HOLDING 
In Morales-Santana, the Second Circuit reversed the BIA’s 
decision, holding that the gender-based difference in the physical 
presence requirement scheme imposed by §§ 1409(c) and 1401(a)(7) 
is an equal protection violation.47 The court determined the proper 
remedy was to apply the shorter physical presence requirement, which 
applies to unwed citizen mothers, to unwed citizen fathers as well and 
 
 38.  Id. at 59–60.  
 39.  Id. at 62. 
 40.  Id. at 64–65.  
 41.  Id. at 62.  
 42.  Id.  
 43.  United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 564 U.S. 210 
(2011).  
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210, 210 (2011).  
 47.  Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521, 524 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 
2545 (2016).   
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that accordingly, Morales-Santana had obtained derivative citizenship 
at birth from his father.48 
After quickly rejecting Morales-Santana’s arguments that his 
father had satisfied the physical presence requirement,49 the Second 
Circuit determined that intermediate scrutiny should be applied.50 The 
Government urged the court to apply rational basis review in 
accordance with Fiallo v. Bell.51 The Second Circuit distinguished 
Fiallo because, unlike the plaintiffs in Fiallo who were aliens seeking 
admission to the United States, Morales-Santana claimed to have 
“pre-existing citizenship at birth.”52 Morales-Santana’s equal 
protection claim therefore did not “implicate Congress’s ‘power to 
admit or exclude foreigners.’”53 The court also noted that the Supreme 
Court had the opportunity to apply Fiallo to gender-based 
distinctions in § 1409 in Miller, Nguyen, and Flores-Villar, but did not 
do so.54 
The court then applied intermediate scrutiny to the Government’s 
asserted interests.55 With respect to the Government’s first interest, 
“ensur[ing] that foreign-born children of parents of different 
nationalities have a sufficient connection to the United States to 
warrant citizenship,” the court could find no explanation for why 
“unwed fathers need more time than unwed mothers . . . to assimilate 
the values that the statute seeks to ensure are passed on to citizen 
children born abroad.”56 The court did not find the Government’s 
reliance on Nguyen convincing because Morales-Santana’s father 
legitimated him, thereby ensuring that a biological tie and 
opportunity to have a meaningful relationship existed.57 The court 
noted that although “unwed mothers and father are not similarly 
situated” when it comes to the biologically-based ties in Nguyen, they 
“are similarly situated with respect to how long they should be 
present . . . in order to have assimilated citizenship-related values to 
transmit to the child.”58 Requiring a longer physical presence 
 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id. at 527. 
 50.  Id. at 529.  
 51.  Id. at 528. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 528–29.  
 55.  Id. at 530.  
 56.  Id. (citations omitted).  
 57.  Id. at 530–31. 
 58.  Id. at 531 (emphasis in original).  
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requirement for unwed citizen fathers is therefore “not substantially 
related to the goal of ensuring a sufficient connection between citizen 
children and the United States.”59 
The Government’s second asserted interest was preventing 
statelessness.60 The court examined the congressional hearings and 
reports relating to the 1940 and 1952 versions of the Act and could 
find no evidence that statelessness was actually an underlying 
concern.61 Furthermore, even if preventing statelessness was a 
motivating factor, it did not satisfy intermediate scrutiny because an 
effective gender-neutral alternative was available.62 
Having found that basing different physical presence requirements 
on gender violates equal protection, the court turned to determining 
the appropriate remedy. The court held that the one-year continuous 
presence requirement should apply to children born abroad to both 
unwed citizen fathers and mothers, and thereby recognized that 
Morales-Santana had obtained derivative citizenship at birth from his 
father.63 Neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history were 
conclusive with regard to the proper remedy, so the court looked to 
binding precedent which “cautions [the court] to extend rather than 
contract benefits.”64 In response to the Government’s argument that 
this remedy grants citizenship, which the court lacks the power to give, 
the Second Circuit asserted that it was not creating citizenship, but 
rather recognizing Morales-Santana’s pre-existing citizenship by 
remedying a constitutional defect.65 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
Lynch v. Morales-Santana involves two main issues. First, whether 
the scheme established by §§ 1401 and 1409, which requires unwed 
citizen fathers to fulfill a substantially longer physical presence 
requirement than unwed citizen mothers in order to transmit 
derivative citizenship to their foreign-born children, violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. Second, whether the 
Second Circuit provided the appropriate remedy. 
 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 532–33.  
 62.  Id. at 534.  
 63.  Id. at 524.  
 64.  Id. at 537. 
 65.  Id.  
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A. The Government’s Arguments 
The Government argues that the Court should apply rational basis 
review, because it should defer to Congress’s plenary power over 
naturalization.66 Therefore, the Second Circuit erred by declining to 
follow Fiallo.67 Deciding whether or not children born abroad should 
be citizens falls within Congress’s exclusive authority.68 Courts are not 
“well-positioned to second-guess Congress’s complex judgments” in 
this area.69 
Next, the Government argues that the gender-based physical 
presence scheme is constitutional even under heightened scrutiny.70 
The Government first asserts that the differing physical presence 
requirements are substantially related to ensuring that citizenship is 
only extended to children born abroad who have “sufficiently robust 
connection[s]” to the United States.71 When only one parent of a child 
born abroad is a U.S. citizen, that child is “subject to competing claims 
of national allegiance,” which therefore requires a “stronger 
connection to the United States.”72 
The Government further argues that while § 1409 does use the 
terms “mother” and “father,” it is not doing so because of gender, but 
out of recognition that at the time of birth an unwed mother has a 
legal relationship to her child, while an unwed father does not.73 The 
risk of competing national allegiances is reduced when the only 
legally recognized parent is a U.S. citizen.74 Therefore, Congress 
decided that unwed mothers could fulfill a shorter physical presence 
requirement, more similar to what is required of two married U.S. 
citizen parents of a child born abroad.75 The Government also relies 
on Nguyen, and the proposition that “unwed U.S.-citizen mothers and 
unwed U.S.-citizen fathers are not similarly situated in every respect” 
at the time of a child’s birth.76 
 
 
 66.  Brief for Petitioner at 8–9, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, NO. 15-1191 (U.S. Aug. 19, 
2016) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].  
 67.  Id. at 17.  
 68.  Id. at 14.  
 69.  Id. at 16.   
 70.  Id. at 9.  
 71.  Id. at 18.  
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 10.  
 74.  Id. at 9. 
 75.  Id. at 10. 
 76.  Id. at 39. 
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Additionally, the Government argues that §§ 1401 and 1409 are 
substantially related to reducing statelessness.77 The shorter physical 
presence requirement for unwed citizen mothers reflects Congress’s 
finding that the risk of statelessness was greater for children born 
abroad to unwed citizen mothers.78 
Finally, the Government argues that the Second Circuit did not 
apply the appropriate remedy.79 Only Congress has the authority to 
confer citizenship, but the Second Circuit’s remedy extends 
citizenship to Morales-Santana and “an untold number of individuals” 
whose parents did not meet the statutory requirements set by 
Congress.80 Furthermore, it “could not be more clear that Congress 
intended . . . to impose substantial physical-presence requirements in 
order for the children born abroad of one U.S.-citizen parent and one 
alien parent to acquire U.S. citizenship from birth.”81 Therefore, if §§ 
1401 and 1409 do violate equal protection, the proper remedy is to 
apply the longer physical presence requirement to children born 
abroad to both unwed citizen mothers and fathers.82 
B. Morales-Santana’s Arguments 
Morales-Santana argues that the Second Circuit correctly held 
that the physical presence requirements in §§ 1401 and 1409 
unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of gender.83 Sections 1401 
and 1409 facially discriminate on the basis of sex and therefore must 
be subject to heightened scrutiny.84 Fiallo should not be relied upon to 
apply a more deferential standard of review.85 Unlike the petitioners 
in Fiallo, Morales-Santana claims that a U.S. citizen, his father, is 
being subjected to sex discrimination.86 Also, Morales-Santana “does 
not claim . . . any new immigration status, but instead claims 
preexisting citizenship at birth.”87 
Additionally, Morales-Santana argues that the gender-based 
physical presence requirement scheme is not substantially related to   
 
 77.  Id. at 33.  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id. at 49.  
 80.  Id. at 49–50.  
 81.  Id. at 53.  
 82.  Id. at 12.  
 83.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 15.  
 84.  Id. at 11.  
 85.  Id. at 17.  
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. (emphasis in original).  
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either of the Government’s asserted interests, but instead reflects 
“archaic and overbroad gender stereotypes.”88 Morales-Santana notes 
that there is no evidence that Congress enacted this scheme to ensure 
foreign-born children have strong ties to the United States89 and that, 
in fact, it serves to reduce the likelihood that children born abroad to 
U.S. citizen mothers will have these ties.90 Even if Congress’s purpose 
were to ensure a child born abroad would have a strong connection to 
the United States, the physical presence scheme is overbroad because 
it allows a U.S. citizen mother who only spent the first year of her life 
in the United States to pass on citizenship to her child.91 
In response to the Government’s argument that the term 
“mother” is simply used to denote the only legally recognized parent 
at birth, Morales-Santana contends that “‘the moment of birth’ is not 
dispositive, for the statute permits at-birth citizenship to be conferred 
retroactively upon the legitimation of the child” by his father.92 
Nguyen also does not support the constitutionality of this scheme 
because the “discriminatory physical presence requirements at issue 
here do not account for biological differences” of mothers and 
fathers.93 Once an unwed citizen father legitimates his child, he is 
similarly situated to an unwed citizen mother with respect to how long 
he needs to have been present in the United States in order to pass on 
strong national allegiance to his child.94 
Morales-Santana also contends that physical presence 
requirements do not reduce the risk of statelessness.95 There is no 
evidence that Congress was actually concerned about statelessness 
when enacting §§ 1401 and 1409,96 and the historical record 
undermines the Government’s argument that the risk of statelessness 
was greater for children born to unwed citizen mothers.97 
Furthermore, the ten-year physical presence requirement actually 
 
 88.  Id. at 19.  
 89.  Id. at 20.  
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 27–28. 
 92.  Id. at 12. 
 93.  Id. at 27 (emphasis in original).  
 94.  See id. (observing that “there is no reason to suppose ‘that unwed fathers need more 
time than unwed mothers in the United States . . . to assimilate the values the statute seeks to 
ensure are passed on to citizen children born abroad.’”).   
 95.  Id. at 30.  
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 13.  
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increases the risk of statelessness for children born abroad to unwed 
citizen fathers.98 
In addition, Morales-Santana argues that the poor fit between the 
gender-based physical presence requirements and the Government’s 
asserted interests demonstrates that the distinction between mothers 
and fathers is actually based on “archaic and overbroad stereotypes 
reflecting ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males 
and females.’”99 The administrative and legislative history confirms 
that Congress required unwed citizen mothers to fulfill a shorter 
physical presence requirement because “mothers, not fathers, are the 
‘natural guardians’ and primary caretakers of nonmarital children.”100 
Finally, Morales-Santana argues the Second Circuit applied the 
correct remedy by extending the shorter physical presence 
requirement to unwed citizen fathers.101 The court did not exceed its 
authority in holding that Morales-Santana is a citizen because it did 
not grant a new right of citizenship to him, but rather confirmed his 
pre-existing citizenship that was evident once the constitutional defect 
in the statute was corrected.102 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Court should affirm the Second Circuit’s decision and hold 
that §§ 1401 and 1409’s physical presence requirements violate the 
equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.  The Court 
previously considered the equal protection implications of this 
gender-based, physical presence requirement scheme in Flores-Villar 
and split 4-4, with Justice Kagan recusing herself.103 Lynch v. Morales-
Santana will also be decided by eight justices, but this time Justice 
Kagan could provide the fifth vote needed to break the tie. 
A. The Court Should Apply Intermediate Scrutiny 
The scheme established by §§ 1401 and 1409 is facially sex 
discriminatory because it applies a longer physical presence 
 
 98.  Id. at 39.   
 99.  Id. at 41 (citation omitted). 
 100.  Id. at 41–42.   
 101.  See id. at 48 (“[S]uch a remedy neither exceeds judicial authority nor violates 
congressional intent.”).  
 102.  See id. at 50 (“Curing the statute of its constitutional defect would ‘confirm 
[respondent’s] pre-existing citizenship rather than grant [him] rights that [he] does not now 
possess.’”).  
 103.  Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011).  
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requirement to unwed citizen fathers than it does to unwed citizen 
mothers. The Court has repeatedly established that laws drawing 
distinctions on the basis of gender must be reviewed under 
intermediate scrutiny.104 
The Court should reject the Government’s argument to apply a 
more deferential standard of review because Congress’s plenary 
power over naturalization and immigration is not implicated in this 
case.105 Here, Morales-Santana is claiming to have pre-existing 
citizenship at birth.106 This is distinct from deciding which foreigners 
to admit or exclude, which forms the heart of Congress’s immigration 
powers.107 Congress has also defined the term “naturalization” in a 
way that plainly excludes at-birth citizenship.108 Furthermore, the 
Court has never used a lower standard of review in deference to 
Congress’s plenary power to determine the constitutionality of 
statutes concerning citizenship at birth.109 Fiallo v. Bell is 
distinguishable in that the petitioners in Fiallo sought a special 
immigration benefit, which implicated Congress’s immigration 
powers, whereas Morales-Santana is claiming pre-existing citizenship, 
which does not.110 
B. The Gender-Based Physical Presence Requirement Scheme Violates 
Equal Protection 
For a discriminatory gender-based classification to survive 
intermediate scrutiny it must be “substantially related” to the 
achievement of an important governmental interest.111 The 
 
 104.  See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003); United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994).  
 105.  See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 480–81 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)) (“Because §§ 1401 and 
1409 govern the conferral of citizenship at birth, and not the admission of aliens, the ordinary 
standards of equal protection review apply.”) .  
 106.  Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521, 528 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 
2545 (2016).   
 107.  See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6 (1977) (“We are dealing here with an exercise 
of the Nation’s sovereign power to admit or exclude foreigners . . . .”). 
 108.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) (2012) (“The term ‘naturalization’ means the conferring of 
nationality of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever.”) (emphasis added).  
 109.  See Miller, 523 U.S. at 480 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court to my knowledge has 
never said, or held, or reasoned that statutes automatically conferring citizenship ‘at birth’ . . . 
receive a more lenient standard of review.”).  
 110.  See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 96 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Fiallo . . . is readily 
distinguished. Fiallo involved constitutional challenges to various statutory distinctions . . . that 
determined the availability of a special immigration preference . . . .”).  
 111.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (citation omitted).  
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justification for the classification cannot “rely on overbroad 
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences 
of male and females.”112 “The burden of justification is demanding 
and it rests entirely on the State.”113 Here, the Government has failed 
to meet that burden. 
The gender-based physical presence requirement scheme is not 
substantially related to ensuring children born abroad have strong ties 
to the United States. The Government argues that “mother” is used as 
a neutral term signifying a child born out of wedlock’s only legally 
recognized parent at birth, so those children are less likely to be 
subjected to competing national influences.114 This argument only 
makes sense if one assumes that the unwed father will not be involved 
in the child’s life.115 This type of assumption is not permissible116 and 
reflects “a historic regime that left women with responsibility, and 
freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children.”117 It also 
ignores the reality that today many fathers are raising their children as 
single parents,118 many non-marital births take place in cohabiting 
households,119 and that many fathers acknowledge paternity for their 
non-marital children in the hospital at the time of the child’s birth.120 
What really undercuts the legitimacy of this interest is the poor fit 
between the differing gender-based physical presence requirements 
and the Government’s purported justification. The physical presence 
requirement scheme allows an unwed citizen mother to transmit 
citizenship to her child, even if she only spent the first year of her life 
 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).  
 114.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 66, at 9.  
 115.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 20–21.  
 116.  See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (stating that justifications for gender classifications “must 
not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities or preferences of 
males and females”).  
 117.  Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 92 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 118.  See Gretchen Livingston, Pew Research Center, The Rise of Single Fathers (July 2, 
2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/07/02/the-rise-of-single-fathers (stating that in 2013 
single fathers accounted for 24% of single parent households).  
 119.  See Carl Haub, Rising Trend of Births Outside Marriage, POPULATION REFERENCE 
BUREAU (Apr. 2013), http://www.prb.org/publications/articles/2013/nonmarital-births.aspx 
(finding that from 20062010 42% of nonmarital births in the United States occurred in 
cohabitating households).  
 120.  See Ronald Mincy et al., In-Hospital Paternity Establishment and Father Involvement in 
Fragile Families, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 611, 623 (2005) (finding that paternity is established 
for 70% of nonmarital children with six of seven paternities established through “voluntary in-
hospital programs”).  
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in the United States and has no plans to return.121 In contrast, an 
unwed citizen father who spent the first eighteen years of his life in 
the United States before leaving cannot pass on U.S. citizenship at 
birth to his child.122 It is not logical to think that a mother who has not 
been in the United States since infancy is better equipped to pass on 
strong ties to the United States than a father who lived there for 
eighteen years.  
The Government’s purported interest in reducing statelessness is 
no more convincing. Scholars concur that gender discrimination in 
citizenship laws “is a major cause of statelessness” and the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has made 
removing gender discrimination from such laws an integral part of its 
plan to eliminate statelessness.123 
In 1958 and still today, there is a substantial risk that children born 
abroad to unmarried U.S. citizen fathers will be stateless.124 In at least 
thirty countries an unwed mother either could not or currently cannot 
provide her citizenship to her non-marital child.125 By placing a 
substantial burden, that is sometimes impossible to satisfy, on unwed 
U.S. citizen fathers, § 1401(a)(7) exacerbates the risk that children 
born in these countries will be stateless.126 Because the gender-based 
physical presence scheme actually increases the problem the 
Government alleges Congress was trying to solve, it is not 
substantially related to this interest. 
C. The Second Circuit Applied the Correct Remedy 
The Court should affirm the Second Circuit’s decision to extend 
the benefit of the shorter, one-year, continuous presence requirement 
to unwed citizen fathers. The goal of remedying equal protection 
violations is to “place persons unconstitutionally denied an 
 
 121.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952) (stating that a child born abroad to an unwed citizen 
mother gains U.S. citizenship at birth “if the mother had previously been physically present in 
the United States or one of its outlying possession for a continuous period of one year”).  
 122.  See § 1401(a)(7) (requiring that unwed citizen fathers be physically present in the 
United States “for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were 
after attaining the age of fourteen years”). 
 123.  Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars on Statelessness in Support of Respondent at 12, Lynch 
v. Morales-Santana, NO. 15-1191 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2016).  
 124.  Id. at 9–10.  
 125.  Id. at 14.  
 126.  Note that because § 1401(a)(7) required that an unwed father be present in the U.S. 
for at least five years after the age of fourteen prior to his child’s birth, it is impossible for a 
father under the age of nineteen to provide citizenship to his child under this statute.  
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opportunity or advantage in ‘the position they would have occupied 
in the absence of [discrimination].’”127 Applying the ten-year physical 
presence requirement to both genders moving forward would not 
achieve this goal. Citizenship has already been granted under the 
statute to children of unwed citizen mothers and once citizenship has 
been conferred it cannot be retracted.128 This means that even though 
mothers and fathers would be treated equally moving forward, 
equality has not been restored because an unwed U.S. citizen mother 
who has already provided citizenship at birth to her child gets to 
retain that benefit, while an unwed citizen father, like Morales-
Santana’s, still has not had that same opportunity. 
Additionally, when deciding on a remedy, the Court looks to 
Congress’s intent when enacting the statute.129 Unless there is clear 
congressional intent otherwise, “ordinarily ‘extension, rather than 
nullification is the proper course.’”130 For example, in Califano v. 
Westcott, the Court remedied an unconstitutional gender classification 
in the Social Security Act, which provided benefits to families with 
dependent children when a father but not a mother became 
unemployed, by replacing “father” with “its gender-neutral 
equivalent.”131 This had the effect of ensuring that benefits would be 
“paid to families with an unemployed parent on the same terms that 
benefits have long been paid to families with an unemployed 
father.”132 The Court noted that extension of benefits conformed with 
Congress’s intent in drafting the statute because withdrawing benefits 
would “impose hardship on beneficiaries whom Congress plainly 
meant to protect.”133 Similarly, withdrawing the benefit of the one-
year continuous presence requirement would contradict Congress’s 
intent to provide at birth citizenship to mothers meeting this 
requirement. 
 
 127.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).  
 128.  See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding that every citizen has “a 
constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that 
citizenship”).  
 129.  See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 292 n.31 (1987) (“[T]he Court 
must look to the intent of the . . . legislature to determine whether to extend benefits or nullify 
the statute.”).  
 130.  Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 n.5 (1984) (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 
U.S. 76, 89 (1979)).  
 131.  443 U.S. at 91–93.  
 132.  Id. at 92.  
 133.  Id. at 90.  
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Furthermore, the Second Circuit has not exceeded its authority by 
holding that Morales-Santana obtained U.S. citizenship at birth from 
his father. Morales-Santana claims to have pre-existing citizenship at 
birth. The Second Circuit merely confirmed his pre-existing 
citizenship by excising the constitutional defect in the statute which 
does not contravene Congress’s plenary power over naturalization.134 
CONCLUSION 
Sections 1401 and 1409 facially discriminate against unwed citizen 
fathers and reflect stereotypical views that women, not men, are 
children’s natural caretakers.  The Court should find that the different 
physical presence requirements violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal 
protection guarantee and should remedy this violation by extending 
the shorter physical presence requirement to both unwed citizen 
mothers and fathers. 
 
 
 134.  See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 432 (1998) (plurality opinion) (“[J]udgment in 
[plaintiff’s] favor would confirm her pre-existing citizenship rather than grant her rights that she 
does not now possess.”); see also id. at 488–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) 
(“Whatever limitations there may be upon a Court’s powers to grant citizenship, those 
limitations are not applicable here . . . . The statute itself grants citizenship automatically, and 
‘at birth.’ And this Court need only declare that that is so.”).  
